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1. Introduction. Substitution box or S-box is of utmost importance in block ciphers of public key cryptography from the initial days. A 4-bit S-box has been defined as a box of (2 4 =) 16 elements varies from 0 to F in hex, arranged in a random manner as used in Data Encryption Standard or DES [AT90] [HF71][NT77] [NT99] . Similarly for 8 bit S-box, number of elements are 2 8 or 256 those varies from 0 to 255 as used in Advance Encryption Standard or AES [DR00] [VM95] . So the construction of S-boxes is a major issue in cryptology from initial days. Use of irreducible polynomials to construct 8-bit S-boxes had already been adopted by crypto community. But the study of IPs has been limited to almost binary Galois field GF(2 q ) as used in AES S-boxes [DR00] [VM95] . So it is important to study 4-bit BFs, 8-bit BFs and polynomials over Galois Field GF(p q ) where p>2 in public key cryptography. A brief literature study on polynomials has been elaborated in sec.2.
A 4-bit Boolean Function (BF) gives 1-bit output for 4 input bits [AT90] and represented in the form of a 16-bit output (column) vector. The truth table of a 4-bit BF has been represented by a 16-bit output vector each of whose bit is an output bit corresponding to 16 possibilities of 4-bit sequential inputs from '0000' to '1111'. The 16 rows of the 4-bit sequential inputs, each bit at the same column position comprises of 16 bits and thereby four 16-bit columns provide four 4-bit input vectors which are common for all 4-bit BFs. Since there are 16 output bits so there are 2 16 (=65536) different possibilities whose decimal equivalent vary between 0 and 65535 [AT90] . Hence, 4-bit BFs have four 16-bit input vectors and 65536 possible 16-bit output vectors. Where an 8-bit BF gives 1-bit output for 8 input bits [DR00] and represented in the form of a 256-bit output (column) vector. The truth table of a 8-bit BF is represented by a 256-bit output vector each of whose bit is an output bit corresponding to 256 possibilities of 8-bit sequential inputs from '00000000' to '11111111'. The 256 rows of the 8-bit sequential inputs, each bit at the same column position comprises of 256 bits and thereby eight 256-bit columns provide eight 8-bit input vectors which are common for all 8-bit BFs. The 256 output bits, there are 2 256 different possibilities whose decimal equivalent vary between 0 and 2 256 -1 [VM95] . Hence, 8-bit BFs have eight 256 bit long 8-bit input vectors and 2 256 possible 256-bit output vectors. Hence for generation and security analysis of 4-bit or 8-bit S-boxes it is an urgent need to study cryptographic properties of S-boxes as well as security of S-boxes with 4-bit or 8-bit BFs. In other words a 4-bit S-box can be represented by a four valued 4-bit BF. If the 1 st bit of the 4 output bits is taken sequentially for each element of the 16 elements of an S-box, one gets the 1 st BF; 2nd sequence of output bit, the 2 nd BF; 3 rd sequence of output bit, the 3 rd BF and 4 th sequence of output bit, the 4 th BF [AT90] respectively. Some cryptographic properties and security analysis of 4-bit S-boxes such as Output Bit Independence Criterion (BIC) of 4-bit S-boxes, SAC of 4-bit S-boxes, Higher order SAC of 4-bit S-boxes, Extended SAC of 4-bit S-boxes, Linear Cryptanalysis of 4-bit Sboxes, Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-boxes, and Differential Cryptanalysis with 4-bit BFs of 4-bit S-boxes as well as Linear Approximation Analysis of 4-bit S-boxes has been reported below in brief.
A 4-bit S-box consists of four 4-bit BFs. In Output Bit Independence Criterion or BIC the difference or xored BFs of all two possible 4-bit BFs of the concerned S-box has been taken under consideration. If all 6 difference 4-bit BFs have been balanced then the criterion has been satisfied for the concerned S-box. Since all 6 difference 4-bit BFs have been balanced so the prediction of a bit value to be one or zero is in at most uncertainty [AT90] . A brief review of BIC of 4-bit as well as 8-bit S-boxes has been illustrated in subsec.3.1of sec 3.
In Strict Avalanche Criterion, 4 IPVs of a 4-bit BF has been complemented one at a time. If in complemented four 4-bit BFs 8 bit values has been changed and 8 bit values remains same then the 4-bit BF has been said to satisfy Strict Avalanche Criterion of 4-bit BFs [AT90] [CA90] . Complementing 4 th IPV means interchanging each distinct 8 bit halves of a 4-bit Output BF, whereas complementing 3 rd IPV means interchanging each distinct 4 bit halves of each distinct 8 bit halves, whereas complementing 2 nd IPV means interchanging each distinct 2 bit halves of each distinct 4 bit halves of each distinct 8 bit halves and complementing 1 st IPV means interchanging each bit of all distinct 2-bit halves of a 16 bit long 4-bit BF. In this paper this shifting property has been used to construct an algorithm of SAC of 4-bit BFs. Another new algorithm with flip of index bits has also been introduced in this paper. If all four 4-bit BFs of a 4-bit S-box satisfy SAC for 4-bit BFs then the concerned S-box has been said to satisfy SAC of 4-bit S-boxes [AT90] [CA90] . A detailed Review of old algorithm and new algorithms of SAC has been described in subsec.3.2 of section 3.
In Higher Order Strict Avalanche Criterion (HO-SAC) of 4-bit BFs four IPVs of a 4-bit S-box have been complemented two or three at a time [BS96] . If in complemented ten 4-bit BFs 8 bit values has been changed and 8 bit values remains same then the 4-bit BF has been said to satisfy HO-SAC of 4-bit BFs. A detailed review of old as well as two new algorithms with previous shift method and flip of index bits method has been introduced in this paper in subsec.3.3. of sec.3. In this Paper a detailed review of a new algorithm entitled Extended HO-SAC has been introduced in which four IPVs have been complemented at a time. An Analogy of Extended HO-SAC and Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-boxes have also been elaborated in subsec.3.3. of section.3.
In Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit crypto S-boxes the 16 distant input S-boxes have been obtained by xor operation with each of 16 input differences varies from 0 to F in hex to all 16 elements of input S-box one at a time. The 16 distant S-boxes have been obtained by shuffling the elements of the original S-box in a certain order in which the elements of the input S-boxes have been shuffled in concerned distant input S-boxes. The 16 elements of each S-box and the elements in corresponding position of corresponding distant S-box has been xored to obtain the Difference S-box. The Difference S-box may or may not be a Crypto S-box since it may not have all unique and distinct elements in it. The count of each element from 0 to F in Difference S-box have been noted and put in Difference Distribution Table ( DDT) for security analysis of the S-box [HH96] [HH02] . The concept has been reviewed in detail in subsec.3.4 of sec. 3.
In this paper a review of the new algorithm using 4-bit BFs for Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit crypto S-boxes have been reviewed. An input S-box can be decomposed into four 4-bit Input Vectors (IPVs) with Decimal Equivalents 255 for 4 th IPV, 3855 for 3 rd IPV, 13107 for 2nd IPV, and 21845 for 1st IPV respectively. Now we complement all IPVs one, two, three and four at a time to obtain 16 4-bit Distant input S-boxes. Each of four Output BFs is shifted according to the Shift of four IPVs of input S-boxes to form four IPVs of Distant input S-boxes to obtain Distant S-boxes. The four 4-bit output BFs of S-boxes are xored bitwise with four 4-bit BFs of Distant S-boxes to obtain four 4-bit Difference BFs. For 16 Distant Output S-boxes there are 64 Difference BFs. Difference BFs are checked for balanced-ness i.e. for at most uncertainty. The Table in which the balancednesses of 64 Difference BFs have been noted has been called as Differential Analysis Table ( DAT). The Theory has been elaborated in subsec. 3.5 of sec.3.
In Linear Cryptanalysis of 4-bit crypto S-boxes, every 4-bit linear relations have been tested for a particular 4-bit crypto S-box. The presence of each 4-bit unique linear relation is checked by satisfaction of each of them for all 16, 4-bit unique input bit patterns and corresponding 4-bit output bit patterns, generated from the index of each element and each element respectively of that particular crypto S-box. If they are satisfied 8 times out of 16 operations for all 4-bit unique input bit patterns and corresponding 4-bit output bit patterns, then the existence of the 4-bit linear equation is at a stake. The probability of presence and absence of a 4-bit linear relation both are (= 8/16) ½. If a 4-bit linear equation is satisfied 0 times then it can be concluded that the given 4-bit linear relation is absent for that particular 4-bit crypto S-box. If a 4-bit linear equation is satisfied 16 times then it can also be concluded that the given 4-bit linear relation is present for that particular 4-bit crypto S-box. In both the cases full information is adverted to the cryptanalysts. The concept of probability bias was introduced to predict the randomization ability of that 4-bit S-box from the probability of presence or absence of unique 4-bit linear relations. The result is better for cryptanalysts if the probability of presence or absences of unique 4-bit linear equations are far away from ½ or near to 0 or 1. If the probabilities of presence or absence of all unique 4-bit linear relations are ½ or close to ½, then the 4-bit crypto S-box has been said to be linear cryptanalysis immune, since the existence of maximum 4-bit linear relations for that 4-bit crypto S-box is hard to predict [HH96] [HH02] . Heys also introduced the concept of Linear Approximation Table ( LAT) in which the numbers of times, each 4-bit unique linear relation have been satisfied for all 16, unique 4-bit input bit patterns and corresponding 4-bit output bit patterns of a crypto S-box have been noted. The result is better for a cryptanalysts if the numbers of 8s in the table are less. If numbers of 8s are much more than the other numbers in the table then the 4-bit crypto S-box has been said to be more linear cryptanalysis immune [HH96] [HH02].
In another look an input S-box can be decomposed into four 4-bit Input Vectors (IPVs) with Decimal Equivalents 255 for 4th IPV, 3855 for 3 rd IPV, 13107 for 2nd IPV, and 21845 for 1st IPV respectively. The S-box can also be decomposed into 4, 4-bit Output BFs (OPBFs). Each IPV can be denoted as a input variable of a linear relation and OPBF as a output variable and '+' as xor operation. Linear relations have been checked for satisfaction and 16-bit output variables (OPVs) due to linear relations have been checked for balanced-ness. Balanced OPVs indicates, out of 16 bits of IPVs and OPBFs, 8 bits satisfies the linear relation and 8 bits is out of satisfaction, i.e. best uncertainty. 256 4-bit linear relations have been operated on 4, 16-bit IPVs and 4, 16-bit OPBFs and 256 OPVs have been generated. The count of number of 1s in OPVs have been put in Linear Approximation Table or LAT. Better the number of 8s in LAT, better the S-box security [HH96] [HH02]. The concept has been reviewed in brief in subsec. 3.6. of sec.3.
In this paper a detailed review of a new technique to find the existing Linear Relations or Linear Approximations for a particular 4-bit S-box has been reviewed. If the nonlinear part of the ANF equation of a 4-bit output BF is absent or calculated to be 0 then the equation is termed as a Linear Relation or Approximation. Searching for number of existing linear relations through this method is ended up with number of existing linear relations. I.e. the goal to conclude the security of a 4-bit crypto S-box has been attended in a very lucid manner by this method. The method has been reviewed in subsec.3. [SJ15] . q bit crypto Substitution box or S-box have 2 q elements in an array where each element is unique and distinct and arranged in a random fashion varies from 0 to 2 q . Polynomials over Galois field GF(p q ) have been termed as binary polynomials if p = 2. The binary number that has been constructed with binary coefficients of all q values with q = 0 at LSB and q = q at MSB has been termed as binary Coefficient Number or BCN of q+1 bits. The Binary Coefficient Number or BCN over Galois field GF(p q ) has been similar with log 2 q+1 bit BFs. The log 2 q+1 bit S-boxes have been generated using log 2 q+1 bit BCNs. In this paper crypto 4 and 8 bit S-boxes have been generated using BCNs and the procedure has been continued as a future scope to generate 16 and 32 bit S-boxes. The non-repeated coefficients of BPs over Galois field GF(p q ), where p = 2 (log 2 q+1) and q = p-1 have been used to generate log 2 q+1 bit S-boxes. In this paper proper 4 and 8 bit S-boxes have been generated using BCNs and the procedure has been continued as a future scope to generate 16 and 32 bit S-boxes. In this paper polynomials over Galois Field GF(p q ) and roll of IPs to construct substitution boxes have been reviewed in subsec. 4.1 and respectively of section.4. The generation of 4 and 8 bit S-boxes using BCNs have been elaborated in subsec 4.2 of section 4.. The generation of 4-bit and 8-bit S-boxes with coefficients of non-binary Galois Field polynomials has been depicted in subsec.4.3 of section 4. The cryptographic and security analysis of 32 DES 4-bit S-boxes has been given in subsec.4.4 of sec.4. Detailed cryptographic and security analysis of generated 10 4-bit S-boxes with discussed crypto related cryptographic properties and security criterion have also been given in subsec.4.4. of sec.4. Results have been discussed in Result and Discussion section in subsec.4.5 of sec.4.
Concluding remarks, Acknowledgement and Reference has been given in section 5, 6 and 7 respectively.
2. Literature Survey. In this section an exhaustive relevant literature survey with their specific references has been introduced to crypto literature on IPs and primitive polynomials. In early Twentieth Century Radolf Church initiated the search for irreducible polynomials over Galois Field GF(p q ) for p = 2, 3, 5 and 7 and for p = 2, q = 1 through 11, for p =3, q = 1 through 7, for p = 5, q = 1 through 4 and for p = 7, q = 1 through 3 respectively. A manual polynomial multiplication among respected EPs gives RPs in the said Galois field. All RPs have been cancelled from the list of BPs to give IPs over the said Galois field GF(p q ) [RC35] . Later The necessary condition for a BP to be an IPs had been generalized to Even 2 characteristics. It had also been applied to RPs and gives Irreducible factors mod 2 [RS62] . Next to it Elementary Techniques to compute over finite Fields or Galois Field GF(p q ) had been descried with proper modifications [TD63] . In next the factorization of Polynomials over Galois Field GF(p q ) had been elaborated [EB67] . Later appropriate coding techniques of Polynomials over Galois Field GF(p q ) had been illustrated with example [TK68] . The previous idea of factorizing Polynomials over Galois Field GF(p q ) [EB67] had also been extended to Large value of P or Large Finite fields [EB70] . Later Few Probabilistic Algorithms to find IPs over Galois Field GF(p q ) for degree q had been elaborated with example [MR80] . Later Factorization of multivariate polynomials over Galois fields GF(p) had also been introduced to mathematics community [AL85] . With that the separation of irreducible factors of BPs [EB67] had also been introduced later [RM87] . Next to it the factorization of BPs with Generalized Reimann Hypothesis (GRH) had also been elaborated [LR88] . Later a Probabilistic Algorithm to find irreducible factors of Basic bivariate Polynomials over Galois Field GF(p q ) had also been illustrated [DW90] . Later the conjectural Deterministic algorithm to find primitive elements and relevant primitive polynomials over binary Galois Field GF(2) had been introduced [MR90] . Some new algorithms to find IPs over Galois Field GF(p) had also been introduced at the same time [VS90] . Another use of Generalized Reimann Hypothesis (GRH) to determine irreducible factors in a deterministic manner and also for multiplicative subgroups had been introduced later [LR92] . The table binary equivalents of binary primitive polynomials had been illustrated in literature [MZ94] . The method to find roots of primitive polynomials over binary Galois field GF(2) had been introduced to mathematical community [IS96] . A method to search for IPs in a Random manner and factorization of BPs or to find irreducible factors of BPs in a random fashion had been introduced later [PX96] . After that a new variant of Rabin's algorithm [MR80] had been introduced with probabilistic analysis of BPs with no irreducible factors [GP97] . Later a factorization of univariate Polynomials over Galois Field GF(p) in sub quadratic execution time had also been notified [EV98] . Later a deterministic algorithm to factorize IPs over one variable had also been introduced [EJ01] . An algorithm to factorize bivariate polynomials over Galois Field GF(p) with hensel lifting had also been notified [GA02] . Next to it an algorithm had also been introduced to find factor of Irreducible and almost primitive polynomials over Galois Field GF(2) [BZ03] . Later a deterministic algorithm to factorize polynomials over Galois Field GF(p) to distinct degree factors had also been notified [SE04] . A detailed study of multiples and products of univariate primitive polynomials over binary Galois Field GF(2) had also been done [SM05] . Later algorithm to find optimal IPs over extended binary Galois Field GF(2 m ) [MS07] and a deterministic algorithm to determine Pascal Polynomials over Galois Field GF(2) [CF08] had been added to literature. Later the search of IPs and primitive polynomials over binary Galois Field GF(2) had also been done successfully [AA09] . At the same time the square free polynomials had also been factorized [CR09] where a work on divisibility of trinomials by IPs over binary Galois Field GF(2) [RW09] had also been notified. Later a probabilistic algorithm to factor polynomials over finite fields had been introduced [SM11] . An explicit factorization to obtain irreducible factors to obtain for cyclotomic polynomials over Galois Field GF(p q ) had also been reported later [LQ12] . A fast randomized algorithm to obtain IPs over a certain Galois Field GF(p q ) had been notified [JC13] . A deterministic algorithm to obtain factors of a polynomial over Galois field GF(p q ) had also been notified at the same time [DM14] . A review of construction of IPs over finite fields and algorithms to Factor polynomials over finite fields had been reported to literature [GH14] [NC14] . An algorithm to search for primitive polynomials had also been notified at the same time [WJ14] . The residue of division of BPs by IPs must be 1 and this reported to literature a bit later [SJ15] . The IPs with several coefficients of different categories had been illustrated in literature a bit later [HJ16] . The use of zeta function to factor polynomials over finite fields had been notified later on [BP17] At last Integer polynomials had also been described with examples [EWNN] .
3. Review of crypto relevant properties of 4-bit and 8-bit Crypto S-boxes. In this section crypto relevant property of 4-bit BFs as well as 4-bit S-boxes has been reviewed. The subsec.3.1 has been dedicated to (Output) Bit Independence Criterion. In subsec. 3.2. Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) of 4-bit BFs and 4-bit S-boxes with new methods has been reviewed. The Higher order SAC or HO-SAC has been elaborated in subsec.3.3. A review of Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-boxes, Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-boxes with 4-bit BFs, Linear Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-boxes and Linear Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-boxes with 4-bit BFs or Linear Approximation Analysis has been reviewed in subsec.3.4, subsec.3.5, subsec.3.6, and subsec.3.7 respectively.
3.1 A Brief Review of (Output) Bit Independence Criterion (BIC) of 4, 8 bit S-boxes. A short description of a 4-bit crypto S-box has been given in subsec.3.1.1 of sec 3. The four Input Vectors (IPVs) and four Output Boolean Functions (OPBFs) and the derivation of four IPVs and four OPBFs from elements of Index of 4-bit crypto S-box and elements of 4-bit crypto S-box respectively have been illustrated in subsec.3.2.2.of sec.3. The (Output) Bit Independence Criterion (BIC) of 4-bit S-box has been described with example and Pseudo code in subsec.3.3. of sec.3.
4-bit Crypto S-boxes.
A 4-bit Crypto S-box can be written as follows in Table. 1, where the each element of the first row of Table. 1, entitled as index, have been the position of each element of the crypto S-box within the given crypto S-box and the elements of the 2 nd row, and entitled as S-box have been the elements of the given Substitution box. It can be concluded that the 1 st row is fixed for all possible crypto S-boxes. The values of each element of the 1 st row are distinct, unique and vary between 0 to F in hex. The values of the each element of the 2 nd row of a crypto S-box are also distinct and unique and also vary between 0 to F in hex. Table. 1. 4-bit crypto S-box.
Relation between 4-bit S-boxes and 4-bit Boolean Functions (4-bit BFs). Index of Each element of a 4-bit
crypto S-box and the element itself has been a hexadecimal number and that can be converted into a 4-bit bit sequence that have been given in column 1 through G of row 1 and row 6 under row heading Index and S-box respectively. From row 2 through 5 and row 7 through A of each column from 1 through G of Table. 2. shows the 4-bit bit sequences of the corresponding hexadecimal numbers of the index of each element of the given crypto S-box and each element of the crypto S-box itself. Each row from 2 through 5 and 7 through A from column 1 through G constitutes a 16 bit, bit sequence that is a 16 bit long input vectors (IPVs) and 4-bit output BFs (OPBFs) respectively. column 1 through G of Row 2 has been termed as 4 th IPV, Row 3 has been termed as 3 rd IPV, Row 4 has been termed as 2 nd IPV and Row 5 has been termed as 1 st IPV whereas column 1 through G of Row 7 has been termed as 4 th OPBF, Row 8 has been termed as 3 rd OPBF, Row 9 has been termed as 2 nd OPBF and Row A has been termed as 1 st OPBF [AT90] . The decimal equivalent of each IPV and OPBF has been noted at column H of respective rows. In Table. 3. each column from column 1 through G of row 1 represents each element of 1 st 4-bit S-box of Data Encryption Standard or DES. Column 1 through G of each row 2 through 5 has been each of four OPBFs, OPBF4, OPBF3, OPBF2, OPBF1 respectively. Column 1 through G of each row 6 through B has been each of six DBFs, DBF4,3, DBF4,2, DBF4,1, DBF3,2, DBF3,1 and DBF2,1 respectively. The analysis shows that 6 DBFs have been balanced i.e. consists of 8 0s and 8 1s, so at most uncertainty to determine the occurrence of 0 and 1 value in all four OPBFs. So the given 4-bit S-box has been said to satisfy (Output) Bit Independence Criterion of 4-bit S-boxes. Step 2. If (count ==6) then the crypto 4-bit S-box Satisfies BIC of 4-bit S-boxes; else. does not satisfy BIC of 4-bit S-boxes; Stop. Time complexity of the given pseudo code. Time complexity of the algorithm has been O(n 2 ) since the body contains two nested loops. Table. 2, have been complemented individually one at a time. If due to said operation on OPBF the number of bits has been changed for change of bits in each IPV in COPBF has been 8 or half of the number of bits in a 4-bit BF then the OPBF has been said to satisfy SAC of 4-bit BFs.
Row Column
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IPV4, CIPV4, IPV3, CIPV3, IPV2, CIPV2, IPV1, CIPV1 have been shown in column 2 thorough H of row 1, 3, 7, 9 , D, F, J, L respectively of table.4. The OPBFs and COPBFs due to complementation of CIPV4, CIPV3, CIPV2 and CIPV1 have been shown in column 2 thorough H of row 2, 4, 8, A, E, G and K, M respectively. The Difference BFs or DBFs more specifically, DBF4, DBF3, DBF2, DBF1 have been shown in column 2 thorough H of row 5, B, H, N respectively. Now change in Number of bits in COPBFs from OPBF due to change of bits in CIPV4, CIPV3, CIPV2 and CIPV1 have been 12, 8, 4, 12. So the given OPBF does not satisfy SAC of 4-bit BFs. To Satisfy SAC of 4-bit BFs change in Number of bits in four COPBFs from OPBFs due to change of bits in CIPV4, CIPV3, CIPV2 and CIPV1 must be 8, 8, 8, 8 . If four OPBFs of a particular crypto S-box satisfy SAC of 4-bit BFs individually then the said crypto S-box has been said to satisfy SAC of 4-bit crypto S-boxes. Pseudo Code. Let BF[16] .bit0 has been a bit level array of 16 bits of a 4-bit BF out of 65536 4-bit BFs. and BF [16] has been an array of 16 bits of a 4-bit BF. CV [16] .bit0 has been a bit level array of 16 bits to store either 00FF, 0F0F, 3333, 5555 in hex. CVC [16] Table. 2 constitutes 16 4-bit input binary numbers and 16 4-bit output binary numbers respectively. The binary value of OPBF before and after flip of 16 input binary numbers sequentially in same position 1 bit at a time has been equated. If they are equal 8 times [discarding same occurrences] and out of equality 8 times for flip of 1 bit at a time in the same position of 16 Input binary numbers sequentially for four positions one by one then the 4-bit BF has been said to satisfy SAC of 4-bit BFs.
All elements of the given S-box in hex, Index of each element of the given S-box in hex (INH) and 4 bit binary form (INB) have been given in column 2 through H of row 3, 1, 2 of Table.5 respectively. Each Output BF, OPBF1, OPBF2, OPBF3, OPBF4 has been shown in column 2 through H of row 4, 5, 6, 7 Table.5 respectively. Now 16 INBs before flip and 16 INBs after flip in one bits particularly in bit position 1, 2, 3, 4 have been shown in row 2 through H of column 1, 2, 6, 7, B, C, G, H respectively of Table. 6. The each corresponding bits of OPBF1, OPBF2, OPBF3, OPBF4 before and after flip have been shown in row 2 through H of column 3, 4, 8, 9, D, E, I, J respectively in Table. 6. 1 in any position in row 2 through H of column 5, A, F, K illustrate dissimilarity in bits in corresponding positions of OPBF1, OPBF2, OPBF3 and OPBF4 duly before and after flip in one bits in bit positions 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
If out of 16 positions in each row from 2 through H column of column 5, A, F, K there are 8 1s and 8 0s then the given BF is said to Satisfy SAC of 4-bit BFs. If all four BFs of a given 4-bit crypto S-box satisfy SAC of 4-bit BFs then the S-box has been said to satisfy SAC of 4-bit S-boxes. Here in Table. 6. row I shows the number of bits changed in OPBF1, OPBF2, OPBF3, OPBF4 before and after flip in pos. 1, pos. 2, pos. 3 and pos. 4 respectively. Since the value is not equal to 8 in at least one position for the given OPBF so the concerned OPBF and the given 4-bit S-box does not satisfy SAC of 4-bit BFs and SAC of 4-bit S-boxes respectively. Pseudo Code. The flipping of bits on particular positions are made by proposing 1-bit in four ev vectors as, e0 {0001}, e1 {0010}, e2 {0100} and e3 {1000}. The Algorithm can be written as,
Start.
Step 0A Table. 7. and Table. 8. respectively. Step 1 Step 1 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Table. 8
. Table of HO-SAC Test and Complement Method of HO-SAC Test of 4-bit BFs
All elements of the given S-box, Index of each element of the given S-box in hex (INH) and 4 bit binary form (INB) with position of each bit from 1 to 4 have been given in column 2 through H of row 3, 1, 2 of Table.7 respectively. Each Output BF, OPBF1, OPBF2, OPBF3, OPBF4 has been shown in column 2 through H of row 4, 5, 6, 7 nd order HO-SAC and 3 rd Order HO-SAC for 4-bit BFs together then the Given OPBF has been said to satisfy total HO-SAC for 4-bit BFs. If Four BFs of a crypto 4-bit S-box satisfy total HO-SAC of 4bit BFs individually then the S-box has been said to satisfy HO-SAC of 4-bit Crypto S-boxes. Pseudo code. Let BF[16] .bit0 has been a bit level array of 16 bits of a 4-bit BF out of 65536 4-bit BFs. and BF [16] has been an array of 16 bits of a 4-bit BF. CV [16] .bit0 has been a bit level array of 16 bits to store either 00FF, 0F0F, 3333, 5555 in hex. CVC [16] .bit0 has been a bit level array of 16 bits to store either FF00, F0F0, CCCC, AAAA in hex. Here ^ represents Bitwise Xor operation. NL represents Number of bits changed in lower halves and NU represents Number of bits changed in upper halves.
Start. //Initialization of Variables.
Step 0A: In 2 nd Order HO-SAC, any 2 IPVs shown in column 2 through H of row 1, 2 of sub tables 8-A to 8-F of Table. 8 have been complemented at a time. The complemented or shifted IPVs or CIPVs have been shown in column 2 through H of row 4, 5 of sub tables 8-A to 8-F of Table. 8.The OPBF has been shown in column 2 through H of row 3 of sub tables 8-A to 8-F of Table. 8. Now due to complement of 1 st IPV the resultant OPBF have been shown in column 2 through H of row 6 after shift operation and due to complement of 2 nd IPV at a time the complemented OPBF of the resultant OPBF of the first operation have been shown in column 2 through H of row 7 of sub tables 8-A to 8-F of Table. 8 respectively. The obtained complemented OPBF or COPBF and bitwise xor or Hamming distance (Difference BF or DBF) between OPBF and COPBF have been shown in column 2 through H of row 8, 9 of sub tables 8-A to 8-F of rd Order HO-SAC, any 3 IPVs shown in column 2 through H of row 1, 2 and 3 of sub tables 8-G to 8-J of Table. 8 have been complemented at a time. The complemented or shifted IPVs or CIPVs have been shown in column 2 through H of row 5, 6 and 7 of sub tables 8-G to 8-J of Table. 8.The OPBF has been shown in column 2 through H of row 4 of sub tables 8-G to 8-J of Table. 8. Now due to complement of 1 st IPV the resultant OPBF have been shown in column 2 through H of row 8 after shift operation and due to complement of 2 nd IPV at a time the complemented OPBF of the resultant OPBF of the first operation have been shown in column 2 through H of row 9 and the complemented OPBF of the resultant OPBF of the 2 nd operation have been shown in column 2 through H of row A of sub tables 8-G to 8-J of Table. 9-A, Table. 9-B and Table. 9-C respectively . The each corresponding bits of OPBF1, OPBF2, OPBF3, OPBF4 before and after flip have been shown in row 2 through H of column 3, 4, 8, 9, D, E, I, J respectively in Table. 9-A, Table. 9-B and Table. Table. 9. row I shows the Number of Bits changed in OPBF1, OPBF2, OPBF3, OPBF4 before and after flip in pos. 1, pos. 2, pos. 3 and pos. 4 respectively. Since the value is 12 in all or at least one for the given OPBF so the concerned OPBF and the given 4-bit S-box does Satisfy HO-SAC of 4-bit BFs and HO-SAC of 4-bit S-boxes respectively. D   1011  1000  1  0  1  1011  1100  1  0  1  1011  0010  1  1  0  1011  1101  1 1  0  E  1100  1111  0  0  0  1100  1001  0  1  1  1100  0101  0  1  1  1100  1010  0 0  0  F  1101  1110  1  0  1  1101  1000  1  0  1  1101  0100  1  0  1  1101  1011  1 1  0  G  1110  1100  0  1  1  1110  1011  0  1  1  1110  0111  0  1  1  1110  1000  0 0  0  H  1111  1101  0  0  0  1111  1010  0  0  0  1111  0110  0  1  1  1111  1001 Step 0B: ev[4] ={{0,0,1,1},{0,1,0,1},{1,0,0,1},{1,1,0,0},{1,0,1,0},{0,1,1,0},{0,1,1,1},{1,1,0,1},{1,1,1,0},{1,0,1,1}};
Step 01 ELSE 4-bit BF does not Satisfy SAC.
Step 06: IF all four BFs Satisfy Extended SAC of 4-bit BFs then the given S-Box Satisfies Extended SAC of 4-bit S-Box.
ELSE the given S-Box does not Satisfy Extended SAC of 4-bit S-Box.
Stop.
Time complexity of the given pseudo code. Time complexity of the algorithm has been O(n) since the body contains no nested loops.
A Brief Review of Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-boxes and a new Technique with Boolean Functions for Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-boxes.
The given 4-bit Crypto S-box has been described in sub- 
4-bit Crypto S-boxes:
A 4-bit Crypto S-box can be written as Follows in Table. 11, where the each element of the first row of Table. Table. 11. 4-bit crypto S-box.
Relation between 4-bit S-boxes and 4-bit Boolean Functions (4-bit BFs). Index of Each element of a 4-bit
Crypto S-box and the element itself is a hexadecimal number and that can be converted into a 4-bit bit sequence that are given in column 1 through G of row 1 and row 6 under row heading Index and S-box respectively. From row 2 through 5 and row 7 through A of each column from 1 through G of Table. 12. shows the 4-bit bit sequences of the corresponding hexadecimal numbers of the index of each element of the given Crypto S-box and each element of the Crypto S-box itself. Each row from 2 through 5 and 7 through A from column 1 through G constitutes a 16 bit, bit sequence that is a 16 bit long input vectors (IPVs) and 4-bit output BFs (OPBFs) respectively. column 1 through G of row 2 is termed as 4 th IPV, Row 3 is termed as 3 rd IPV, Row 4 is termed as 2 nd IPV and Row 5 is termed as 1 st IPV whereas column 1 through G of Row 7 is termed as 4 th OPBF, Row 8 is termed as 3 rd OPBF, Row 9 is termed as 2 nd OPBF and row A is termed as 1 st OPBF [AT90] . The decimal equivalent of each IPV and OPBF are noted at column H of respective rows. Table. 12. Decomposition of 4-bit input S-box and given S-box (1 st 4-bit S-box of 1 st S-box out of 8 of DES) to 4-bit BFs.
Row Column
Review of Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit Crypto S-boxes [HH96][HH02]. In Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-
bit Crypto S-boxes, Elements of 4-bit input S-box (ISB) have been xored with a particular 4-bit Input Difference (ID) to obtain a Distant input S-box (DISB). The Distant S-boxes (DSB) have been obtained from original S-box (SB) by shuffling the elements of SB in such order in the way in which the elements of ISB have been shuffled to obtain DISB for a Particular ID. Each element of Difference S-box (DFSB) have been obtained by the xor operation of corresponding elements of SB and DSB. The Count of each Hexadecimal number from 0 to F have been put into the concerned cell of Differential Distribution Table or DDT. As the number of 0s in DDT increases, information regarding concerned Output Difference (OD) increases so the S-box has been determined as weak S-box. The 4-bit Sequence of each element of ISB, ID, DISB, DSB, DFSB have been given in BIN ISB, BIN ID, BIN DISB, BIN DSB, BIN DFSB respectively. The column.1. in Table. 13. from row 1 through G shows the 16 elements of ISB in a monotonically increasing sequence or order. The ISB can also be concluded as an Identity 4-bit S-box. The elements of 1 st 4-bit S-box, out of 4 of 1 st S-box of Data Encryption Standard (DES) out of 8, has been considered as S-box (SB), in column 7 from row 1 through G. The elements of ID, DISB, DSB, DFSB has been shown in row 1 through G of column. 3, 5, 9 and C of Table. 3 respectively. The 4-bit Binary equivalents of each elements of ISB, ID, DISB, SB, DSB, DFSB, has been shown in row 1 through G of column. 2, 4, 6, 8, A and B of Table. 13 respectively.
The review has been done in two different views; The S-box view has been described in subsec.3.4.3.1. in which the concerned column of interest are row 1 through G of column 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and C respectively. The 4-bit binary pattern view has also been described in subsec 
S-box View of Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit Crypto S-boxes.
The S-box with a particular input difference or ID from 0 to F in which all elements have the same value 'B' in hex, is not a Crypto Box but an S-box and is shown in row 1 through G of column. 3. of Table. 13. The Distant input S-box (DISB) is shown in row 1 through G of column.5 of the said table. In DISB each row element from row 1 through G is obtained by the xor operation of the elements in corresponding positions of each element of DISB from row 1 through G of column.1. (ISB) and Column.3. (ID) respectively. In ISB for each row element from row 1 through G of column.1.just in corresponding position from row 1 through G of column.7, there is an element of SB. Now in DISB the elements of ISB have been shuffled in a particular order and In DSB the corresponding elements of SB has also been shuffled in that particular order. Each element of the Difference S-box or DFSB from row 1 through G of column.C. has been obtained by xor operation of each element in corresponding positions from row 1 through G of column.7. and row 1 through G of column.9. respectively. The repetition of each existing elements in DSB have been counted and put into Difference Distribution Table or DDT. It is shown in Table. 14. as follows, Table. 14. Count of repetition of each existing element in DSB.
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The count of each existing elements in DFSB have been put into Difference Distribution Table. as follows, in row 2 of Table. 15. For Input Difference (ID) = 'B' and Output Difference from 0 through F of row 1. Table. 13. and termed as Bin ISB. The Particular Input Difference '1101' is shown in each row from 1 through G of column. 4. in Table. 13. The Distant 4-bit input bit patterns are shown from row 1 through G of column.6. (Bin DISB) are obtained by the xor operation of the elements in corresponding positions of each element of BIN DISB from row 1 through G of column.2. (Bin ISB) and Column.4. (Bin ID) respectively. In Bin ISB for each element from row 1 through G of column.2. in corresponding position from row 1 through G of column.8, there is an element of Bin SB. Now in Bin DISB the elements of ISB have been shuffled in a particular order and in Bin DSB the corresponding elements of SB has also been shuffled in that particular order. Each element from row 1 through G of column.11. has been obtained by xor operation of each element in corresponding positions from row 1 through G of column.8. and row 1 through G of column.10. respectively. The repetition of each existing elements in Bin DFSB have been counted and put into Difference Distribution Table. 16. Count of repetition of each existing element in Bin DSB.
4-bit binary Pattern View of Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit Crypto S-boxes. The corresponding four bit bit patterns of input S-box elements (ISB) has been shown from row 1 through G of column.2 in
The count of each existing elements in Bin DFSB have been put into the Differential Distribution Table. as follows, in row 2 of Table. 17a. for Binary Input Difference (Bin ID) '1101' and Output Difference from 0 through F of row 1. 
Pseudo Code for Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit Crypto S-boxes and its Time Complexity Analysis.
The 
Comparison of Time Complexity of Two views of Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit S-boxes.
The Comparison of time complexity of two algos has been given in Table. It can be concluded from the comparison that the Execution Time reduces in S-box view than the 4-bit Binary Pattern view. So in can be concluded from above review work that the execution time of Differential Cryptanalysis depends upon the view of the algorithm and the S-box view has been proved to be a better algorithm than 4-bit binary pattern view algorithm. 3.5 Differential Cryptanalysis of 4-bit Bijective Crypto S-boxes with 4-bit BFs. The Procedure to obtain four Input Vectors (IPVs) and Four Output BFs (OPBFs) from the elements of a particular 4-bit Crypto S-box has been described in sec.2.1. The procedure to obtain distant Input Vectors (DIPVs) and Distant Output BFs (DOPBFs) for a particular Input Difference (ID) of the said S-box has been described with example in sec.3.5. Table. 13. respectively.
Here the 4 th OPBF has been taken as an example of OPBF and termed as OPBF. Since complement of 4 th IPV means interchanging each 8 bit halves of 16 bit long 4 th IPV so The 2, 8 bit halves of OPBF have been interchanged due to complement of 4 th IPV. The resultant OPBF has been shown from column 1 through G of row 6 in Table. 19. Again No Operation on 3 rd IPV means CIPV3 = IPV3 so resultant OPBF is as same as STEP1 and has been shown from column 1 through G of row 7 in Table. 19. Next to it, the complement of 2 nd IPV means interchanging each 2 bit halves of each 4 bit halves of each 8 bit halves of resultant OPBF. The resultant OPBF has been shown from column 1 through G of row 8 in Table. 19. Again the complement of 1 st IPV means interchanging each bit of each 2 bit halves of each 4 bit halves of each 8 bit halves of resultant OPBF, The resultant OPBF After operation has been shown in column 1 through G of row 9 in Table. 19. The Complemented OPBF has been the resultant OPBF of STEP4 and has been shown from column 1 through G of row A in Table. 19.
ID
1 0 1 1 Complement C N C C Table. Table. 19. Construction of DIBFs and DOBFs.
Generation of Difference Boolean Functions or DBFs for a certain ID.
The DBFs of each OPBF have been generated by bitwise Xor of OPBFs and the corresponding COPBFs. The corresponding DBFs of OBPF4, OBPF3, OBPF2, OPBF1 are denoted as DIFF4, DIFF3, DIFF2, DIFF1 respectively. Generation of 4 th DBF of ID '1011' has been shown in column 1 through G of row 3 of Table. 20. Table. 1. and four CIPVs, CIPV4, CIPV3, CIPV2 and CIPV1 for a certain ID '1011' have been shown from column 1 through G of row 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 respectively in Table. 22. Four OPBFs in the order OPBF4, OPBF3, OPBF2 and OPBF1 for the S-box given in Table. 11. and four COPBFs COPBF4, COPBF3, COPBF2 and COPBF1 for a certain ID '1011' have been shown from column 1 through G of row 9, A, B, C, D, E, F and G respectively in Table. 22. The resultant DBFs, DIFF4, DIFF3, DIFF2, DIFF1, have been shown in column 1 through G of row H, I, J, K of Table. 22. The number of 1s or Balanced-ness of four DBFs have been shown in row from column.2 through 5 of row 1 in Table. 23. Table. 25. Time Complexity Comparison of Three Algos. It can be concluded from the comparison that the Execution Time reduces in S-box view and With 4-bit BFs than the 4-bit Binary Pattern view. So in can be concluded from above review work and new algorithm that the execution time of Differential Cryptanalysis depends upon the view of the algorithm and the S-box view has been proved to be a better algorithm than 4-bit binary pattern view algorithm. The With 4-bit BFs Algo has also been proved to be the better one since The DAT table construction is less time consuming than DDT construction since DDT constitutes of 256 entries while DAT constitutes of 64 entries so in can also be concluded from comparison that Differential Cryptanalysis with 4-bit BFs has been proven to be the best algorithm among 3 Algorithms since it takes less execution time among three algorithms. 
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A review of Boolean Functions (BF) and its Algebraic Normal Form (ANF)
A 4-bit Boolean Function (BF) accepts 4 bits as input {x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 }having 16 combinations of decimal values varying between 0 and 15 and provides 1-bit output for each combination of input. The input-output relation is given in a Truth Table which provides 16-bit output vector corresponding to four 16-bit input vectors, each one attached to x 1 , x 2 , x 3 and x 4 . The 4-bit BF is a mapping from (0,1) 4 to (0,1) 1 and its functional relation, F(x) can be expressed in Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) with 16 coefficients as given in eq. (1) 
where x represents the decimal value or the hex value of 4 input bits represented by {x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 }, BF assumes 1-bit output, '.' and '+' represent AND and XOR operations respectively. Here a 0 is a constant coefficient, (a 1 to a 4 ) are 4 linear coefficients, and (a 5 to a 15 ) are 11 nonlinear coefficients of which (a 5 to a 10 ) are 6 non-linear coefficients of 6 terms with 2-AND-operated-input-bits, (a 11 to a 14 ) are 4 nonlinear coefficients of 4 terms with 3-AND-operated-input-bits and a 15 is a non-linear coefficient of one term with 4-AND-operated-input-bits. The 16 binary ANF coefficients, from a 0 to a 15 are marked respectively as anf.bit0 to anf.bit15 in ANF representation and are evaluated from the 16-bit output vector of a BF designated as bf.bit0 to bf.bit15 using the following relations as given in eq.(2), anf.bit0 = bf.bit0; anf.bit1 = anf.bit0 + bf.bit8; anf.bit2 = anf.bit0 + bf.bit4; anf.bit3 = anf.bit0 + bf.bit2; anf.bit4 = anf.bit0 + bf.bit1; anf.bit5 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit1 + anf.bit2 + bf.bit12; anf.bit6 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit1 + anf.bit3 + bf.bit10; anf.bit7 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit1 + anf.bit4 + bf.bit9; anf.bit8 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit2 + anf.bit3 + bf.bit6; anf.bit9 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit2 + anf.bit4 + bf.bit5; anf.bit10 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit3 + anf.bit4 + bf.bit3; 0anf.bit11 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit1 + anf.bit2 + anf.bit3 + anf.bit5 + anf.bit6 + anf.bit8 + bf.bit14; anf.bit12 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit1 + anf.bit2 + anf.bit4 + anf.bit5 + anf.bit7 + anf.bit9 + bf.bit13; anf.bit13 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit1 + anf.bit3 + anf.bit4 + anf.bit6 + anf.bit7 + anf.bit10 + bf.bit11; anf.bit14 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit2 + anf.bit3 + anf.bit4 + anf.bit8 + anf.bit9 + anf.bit10 + bf.bit7; anf.bit15 = anf.bit0 + anf.bit1 + anf.bit2 + anf.bit3 + anf.bit4 + anf.bit5 + anf.bit6 + anf.bit7 + anf.bit8 + anf.bit9 + anf.bit10 + anf.bit11 + anf.bit12 + anf.bit13 + anf.bit14 + bf.bit15 …
The DEBF (Decimal Equivalent of BF) varies from 0 through 65535 and each decimal value is converted to a 16-bit binary output of the Boolean function from bf.bit0 through bf.bit15. Based on the binary output of a BF, the ANF coefficients from anf.bit0 through anf.bit15 are calculated sequentially using eq. (2).
A Review on Linear Cryptanalysis of 4-bit Crypto S-boxes [HH96][HH02].
The given 4-bit Crypto S-box has been described in sub-section 3.6.2.1. The relation of 4-bit S-boxes with 4 bit BFs and with Linear Approximations are described in sub-section 3.6.2.2 and 3.6.2.3 respectively. LAT or Linear Approximation Table has also been illustrated in sec 3.6.2.4. Algorithm of Linear Cryptanalysis with Time Complexity Analysis has been described in sec. 3.6.2.5.
4-bit Crypto S-boxes:
A 4-bit Crypto S-box can be written as Follows in Table. 26, where the each element of the first row of Table. 26, entitled as index, are the position of each element of the S-box within the given S-box and the elements of the 2 nd row, entitled as S-box, are the elements of the given Substitution box. It can be concluded that the 1 st row is fixed for all possible Crypto S-boxes. The values of each element of the 1 st row are distinct, unique and vary between 0 to F in hex. The values of the each element of the 2 nd row of a Crypto S-box are also distinct and unique and also vary between 0 to F in hex. The values of the elements of the fixed 1 st row are sequential and monotonically increasing where for the 2 nd row they can be sequential or partly sequential or non-sequential. Here the given Substitution box is the 1 st 4-bit S-box of the 1 st S-box out of 8 of Data Encryption Standard [AT90] [NT77] [NT99] . Table. 26. 4-bit Crypto S-box.
Row Column
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F G 1 Index 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C D E F 2 S-box E 4 D 1 2 F B 8 3 A 6 C 5 9 0 7
Relation between 4-bit S-boxes and 4-bit Boolean Functions (4-bit BFs). Index of Each element of a 4-bit
Crypto S-box and the element itself is a hexadecimal number and that can be converted into a 4-bit bit sequence that are given in column 1 through G of row 1 and row 6 under row heading Index and S-box respectively. From row 2 through 5 and row 7 through A of each column from 1 through G of Table. 27. shows the 4-bit bit sequences of the corresponding hexadecimal numbers of the index of each element of the given Crypto S-box and each element of the Crypto S-box itself. Each row from 2 through 5 and 7 through A from column 1 through G constitutes a 16 bit, bit sequence that is a 16 bit long input vectors (IPVs) and 4-bit output BFs (OPBFs) respectively. column 1 through G of Row 2 is termed as 4 th IPV, Row 3 is termed as 3 rd IPV, Row 4 is termed as 2 nd IPV and Row 5 is termed as 1 st IPV whereas column 1 through G of Row 7 is termed as 4 th OPBF, Row 8 is termed as 3 rd OPBF, Row 9 is termed as 2 nd OPBF and Row A is termed as 1 st OPBF [AT90] . The decimal equivalent of each IPV and OPBF are noted at column H of respective rows. F 1 1 1 1 C 1 1 0 0 
Row Column
Table. 28. IPVs and OPBFs for given S-box
The IPEs or Input Equations are all possible xored terms that can be formed using four IPVs 4, 3, 2 and 1. On the other hand OPEs are possible xored terms that can be formed using four OPVs 4, 3, 2 and 1. All possible IPEs and OPEs are listed under the column and also row heading (IPE = OPE) from row 2 through H and column 1 through G respectively. Each cell is a linear equation equating IPE to OPE. Such as L 1+2+4,2+3 is the linear equation formed by IPE '1+2+3' i.e. the xored combination of three IPVs 1, 2 and 4 and OPE '2+3' i.e. the xored combination of two OPBFs 2 and 3. The 256 possible 4-bit Linear Equations are shown in Table 29 
Linear Approximation Analysis:
A Crypto 4-bit S-box (1 st 4-bit S-box out of 32 4-bit S-boxes of DES) has been described in sub-section 3.7.1. The Table for four input vectors, Output 4-bit BFs and corresponding ANFs has been depicted in sub-section 3.7.2. The analysis has been described in sub-section 3.7.3. The result of Analysis has been given in sub-section 3.7.4. 3.7.1 4-bit Crypto S-boxes: A 4-bit Crypto S-box can be written as Follows in Table. 31, where the each element of the first row of Table. The 4 th , 3 rd , 2 nd , 1 st IPV for the given S-box have been noted in the Field 'IPVs' under column heading 4, 3, 2, 1 respectively from row 8 through M of Table. 23. The 4 output BFs F4, F3, F2, F1 are noted at column 4, 8, C, G from row 8 through M respectively. The corresponding LP, NP, Satisfaction (SF) values (LP = BF)are noted at column 5 through 7, 9 through B, C through F and H to J from row 8 through M respectively of Table. 33. It can be concluded from the comparison that the Execution time reduces in Linear Approximation Analysis than the Linear Cryptanalysis of 4-bit Crypto S-boxes. So in can be concluded from above review work that the execution time of 4-bit LA Algorithm is much less that 4-bit LC Algorithm so 4-bit LA algorithm has been proved to be much better algorithm. 
S-box
4-bit Crypto S-boxes:
A 4-bit crypto S-box can be written as Follows, where the each element of the first row of Table. Table. 35. 4-bit bijective Crypto S-box. 4.1.3 Relation between 4-bit S-boxes and Polynomials over Galois field GF (2 15 ). Index of Each element of a 4-bit crypto S-box and the element itself is a hexadecimal number and that can be converted into a 4-bit bit sequence. From row 2 through 5 and row 7 through A of each column from 1 through G of Table. 36. shows the 4-bit bit sequences of the corresponding hexadecimal numbers of the index of each element of the given S-box and each element of the S-box itself. Each row from 2 through 5 and 7 through A from column 1 through G constitutes a 16 bit, bit sequence that is a Basic Polynomial or BP over Galois field GF(2 15 ). column 1 through G of Row 2 has been termed as 4 th IGFP, Row 3 has been termed as 3 rd IGFP, Row 4 has been termed as 2 nd IGFP and Row 5 has been termed as IGFP whereas column 1 through G of Row 7 has been termed as 4 th OGFP, Row 8 has been termed as 3 rd OGFP, Row 9 has been termed as 2 nd OGFP and Row A has been termed as 1 st OGFP. The decimal equivalents of each IGFP and OGFP have been noted at column H of respective rows. Here IGFP stands for Input Galois Field Polynomial and OGFP stands for Output Galois Field Polynomials. The respective Polynomials have been shown in Row 1 through 8 of column 3 of Table. 3. Table. 38, entitled as index, have been the position of each element of the S-box within the given S-box and the elements of the 2 nd row, entitled as S-box, are the elements of the given identity Substitution box. It can be concluded that the 1 st row has been fixed for all possible crypto Sboxes. The values of each element of the 1st row are distinct, unique and vary between 0 and F. The values of the each element of the 2 nd row of the identity crypto S-box have also been distinct and unique and also vary between 0 and F. The values of the elements of the fixed 1 st row are sequential and monotonically increasing where for the 2 nd row, they are also sequential and monotonically increasing for this identity S-box. Here the given Substitution Box is the 4-bit identity crypto S-box. Table. 38. 4-bit Identity Crypto S-box.
Row Column
Index of Each element of a 4-bit crypto S-box and the element itself is a hexadecimal number and that can be converted into a 4-bit bit sequence. From row 2 through 5 and row 7 through A of each column from 1 through G of Table. 39. shows the 4-bit bit sequences of the corresponding hexadecimal numbers of the index of each element of the given S-box and each element of the Sbox itself. Each row from 2 through 5 and 7 through A from column 1 through G constitutes a 16 bit, bit sequence that is a Basic Polynomial over Galois field GF(2 15 ). column 1 through G of Row 2 has been termed as 4 th IGFP, Row 3 has been termed as 3 rd IGFP, Row 4 has been termed as 2 nd IGFP and Row 5 has been termed as IGFP whereas column 1 through G of Row 7 has been termed as 4 th OGFP, Row 8 has been termed as 3 rd OGFP, Row 9 has been termed as 2 nd OGFP and Row A has been termed as 1 st OGFP. The decimal equivalents of each IGFP and OGFP have been noted at column H of respective rows. Where IGFP stands for Input Galois Field Polynomials and OGFP stands for Output Galois Field Polynomials. The respective Polynomials have been shown in Row 1 through 8 of column 3 of Table. Step.02. Convert to decimal the 4 or 8 bit binary number generated by bits in same position of 4 BCNs for Galois field Polynomials over Galois field GF(2 15 ) or 8 Galois field Polynomials over Galois field GF(2 255 ). The coefficients of each polynomial over non binary Galois Field GF(256 255 ) forms an 8-bit S-box. The Coefficient of highest or lowest degree term must be the 1 st element in 4-bit S-box, the value of other elements are the value of coefficients with immediate degree less than or greater than the previous one. Let The Polynomial be, Let the Polynomial be given in Table. The value of n C r has been maximum when the value of r is ½ of the value of n (when n is even). Here the maximum number of linear approximations is 64. So if the total satisfaction of linear equation is 32 out of 64 then the number of possible sets of 32 linear equations has been the largest. Means if the total satisfaction is 32 out of 64 then the number of possible sets of 32 possible linear equations is 64 C 32. That is maximum number of possible sets of linear equations. If the value of total No of Linear Approximations is closed to 32 then it is more cryptanalysis immune. Since the number of possible sets of linear equations are too large to calculate. As the value goes close to 0 or 64 it reduces the sets of possible linear equations to search, that reduces the effort to search for the linear equations present in a particular 4-bit S-box. In this example total satisfaction is 21 out of 64. Which means the given 4-bit S-Box is not a good 4 bit S-Box or not a good Crypt analytically immune S-Box.
STOP. Time Complexity of the given Algorithm. O(n).
4 and 8 bit S-box Generation by respective BCNs over Non Binary Galois
If the values of total number of Existing Linear equations for a 4-bit S-Box are 24 to 32, then the lowest numbers of sets of linear equations are 250649105469666120. This is a very large number to investigate. So the 4-bit S-Box is declared as a good 4-bit S-Box or 4-bit S-Box with good security. If it is between 16 through 23 then the lowest numbers of sets of linear equations are 488526937079580. This not a small number to investigate in today's computing scenario so the S-boxes are declared as medium S-Box or S-Box with medium security. The 4-bit S-Boxes having existing linear equations less than 16 are declared as Poor 4-bit S-Box or vulnerable to cryptanalytic attack.
Cryptographic analysis of 32 DES 4-bit S-boxes.
The cryptographic analysis of 32 DES 4-bit S-boxes with the said relevant cryptographic properties of 4-bit BFs has been given below in 25  154  166  42  10  20  12  42  f18e6b34972dc05a  24  132  162  30  6  12  9  30  3d47f28ec01a69b5  21  143  166  30  8  12  7  30  0e7ba4d158c6932f  31  143  166  21  4  10  6  21  d8a13f42b67c05e9  20  126  168  36  8  12  12  36  a09e63f51dc7b428  17  133  162  30  7  12  8  30  d709346a285ecbf1  22  133  168  30  7  13  8  30  d6498f30b12c5ae7  23  151  166  21  6  9  4  21  1ad069874fe3b52c  28  158  174  30  6  11  10  30  7de3069a1285bc4f  22  136  168  36  8  16  10  36  d8b56f03472c1ae9  22  136  168  36  8  16  10  36  a690cb7df13e5284  20  136  168  36  8  16  10  36  3f06a1d8945bc72e  22  136  168  36  8  16  10  36  2c417ab6853fd0e9  25  137  162  30  6  14  8  30  eb2c47d150fa3986  20  143  166  36  8  16  9  36  421bad78f9c5630e  30  130  160  27  6  11  7  27  b8c71e2d6f09a453  21  134  166  18  3  7  6  18  c1af92680d34e75b  30  141  159  36  8  16  10  36  af427c9561de0b38  29  127  164  36  7  15  11  36  9ef528c3704a1db6  24  127  168  18  5  7  5  18  432c95fabe17608d  24  130  162  30  6  12  9  30  4b2ef08d3c975a61  26  134  168  30  7  13  8  30  d0b7491ae35c2f86  27  145  166  30  7  14  7  30  14bdc37eaf680592  28  137  168  36  8  16  10  36  6bd814a7950fe23c  25  135  173  0  0  0  0  0  d2846fb1a93e50c7  23  144  161  30  8  14  7  30  1fd8a374c56b0e92  20  147  174  27  9  12  4  27  7b419ce206adf358  27  132  166  18  5  7  5  18  21e74a8dfc90356b  28  138  168  39  8  16  12  39  Table. 48. Cryptographic analysis of 32 DES S-boxes. 4.4.3. Cryptographic analysis of 10 generated better 4-bit S-boxes. The cryptographic analysis of 10 generated better 4-bit S-boxes with the said relevant cryptographic properties of 4-bit BFs has been given below in table.49. Here in table 49. column heading 'noelr gives numbers of existing linear relations in a particular 4-bit crypto S-box. Column heading 'nobal' gives numbers of balanced DBFs in linear cryptanalysis. 'n0dif' gives numbers of 0s in difference distribution table or DDT and 'nodif' gives numbers of 8s in DAT. 'nosac' gives numbers of COPBFs satisfy SAC of 4-bit BFs and 'n3sac', 'n3sac' and 'nalsac' 
